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Abstract  
Despite a developing literature on various facets of sporting embodiment, there is currently 
a research lacuna with regard to in-depth analyses of actually ‘doing’ sporting activities within 
specific physical cultures. In this article we address that gap by drawing on a developing 
theoretical literature in sociological phenomenology to investigate a particular physical-
cultural domain. Here, we present and analyse data from an ethnographic study of 
competitive swimmers undertaken in the United Kingdom (UK). Responding to calls to explore 
the domain of ‘body pedagogics’, we investigate the embodied work involved in the skilled 
practice of ‘doing’ and learning how to ‘do’ competitive swimming. This embodied work plays 
a key part in the swimmers’ ability to inhabit the competitive swimming lifeworld. In the 
analysis, we highlight how the acquisition and ‘habituation’ of these body techniques and 
skilled behaviors is not achieved simply through the repetitive rehearsal of coherent 
movements over time. These processes are complex, demanding practical experimentation, 
discovery, and the ability constantly to adapt to changes in the environment and the 
swimmer’s own corporeality. 
 
Keywords: sociological phenomenology; competitive swimming; body pedagogics; doing; 
habit 
 
Introduction 
Despite a developing literature that focuses on various facets of sporting embodiment, there 
is currently a research lacuna with regard to in-depth analyses of actually ‘doing’ sporting 
activities within specific physical cultures. In this article, we address that gap by drawing on a 
developing theoretical literature that employs a sociological form of phenomenology to 
investigate particular physical-cultural domains, and place the focus on competitive 
swimming. Responding to calls to explore the domain of ‘body pedagogics’ (Shilling, 2017), 
we investigate the embodied work involved in the skilled practice of ‘doing’ and learning how 
to ‘do’ competitive swimming, presenting data from an ethnographic study of competitive 
swimmers undertaken in the United Kingdom (UK). This embodied work plays a key part in 
the swimmers’ ability effectively to inhabit the competitive swimming lifeworld. In the 
analysis, we highlight how the acquisition and ‘habituation’ of these body techniques and 
skilled behaviors is not achieved simply through the repetitive rehearsal of coherent 
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movements over time. These processes are complex, demanding practical experimentation, 
discovery, and the ability constantly to adapt to changes in the environment and the 
swimmer’s own corporeality. 
Competitive swimmers regularly spend between 10 and 25 hours per week in the water, 
covering anywhere from 25 to over 100 kilometers of swimming. This volume of work is 
widely accepted within the swimming ‘lifeworld’ (the world of everyday life as subjectively 
and intersubjectively experienced) as the norm and is often adopted early in a swimmer’s 
career, usually during adolescence. In addition to this volume of pool-based training, such 
swimmers will often supplement their pool-work with land-based training such as weight-
training, circuits, and ‘spinning’ (cycling in a gym setting). Swimming at this level requires the 
development of a significant level of corporeal proficiency through the acquisition and 
continued refinement of a variety of body techniques (Mauss, 1979). The aim of this article is 
to explore and describe the most prominent of these body techniques and the development 
of corporeal ways of knowing and ‘doing’ competitive swimming; a process that demands 
constant monitoring and (re)evaluation of skilled movements and techniques. Hence, our 
purpose is to investigate the nexus of mind-body-environment in sporting experience, which 
remains sociologically under-researched, particularly in relation to Shilling’s (2017) call for 
sociology to address body pedagogics: an embodied approach to the acquisition and 
transmission of sporting, occupational, and other culturally-structured practices. 
Interestingly, much of the extant sociological research on competitive swimming utilizes 
a Foucauldian perspective. For example, McMahon et al. (2012) liken the training practices 
undertaken by competitive swimmers in the Australian swimming culture, enforced on them 
by coaches and team managers in the name of performance, to Foucault’s notion of 
‘discipline’, leading to the creation of docile bodies. McMahon and Penney (2013a; 2013b) 
also draw upon Foucault’s notions of ‘surveillance’ and ‘the gaze’ to highlight how within a 
sporting context the body can be subjected to visual scrutiny from many eyes, including those 
of coaches, team-mates, parents and the self. Lang (2010) also draws attention to the 
surveillance and conformity of athletes, highlighting how the pressure of constant 
surveillance leads to athletes submitting to intensive training protocols and normalized 
practices. Whilst these studies are helpful in illuminating the disciplinary forces at work in this 
particular physical culture, these studies often explore what is done to the body by various 
social-structural forces and power relations, rather than what is done by the body. In contrast, 
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here we embrace an embodied perspective that investigates the lived, corporeally-grounded 
experience of competitive swimming, in order to illuminate a perspective from the 
competitive-swimming body, whilst acknowledging that social-structural forces strongly 
shape this experience. 
In doing so, we draw connections with Throsby’s (2016) ‘aquatic sociology’. Her work 
highlights the body techniques that marathon swimmers incorporate and embody reflexively 
in order to swim long distances, and belong to the wider community of marathon swimming. 
We further develop Throsby’s work by contributing insights from competitive pool-
swimming. Crossley’s (1995) notion of a ‘carnal sociology’ is also germane to our work in 
addressing aquatic experiences of ‘intense embodiment’ (Allen-Collinson and Owton, 2015). 
We therefore portray the social actor not just as a wielder of symbols, but as a ‘sensate, 
suffering, skilled, sedimented and situated creature of flesh and blood’ (Wacquant, 2015: 1). 
Before describing the research from which our embodied data derive, we first provide a brief 
overview of our theoretical framework of sociological phenomenology. 
 
Sociological phenomenology and sporting embodiment 
Originated in its modern-day transcendental form by the German philosopher, Edmund 
Husserl (1970), phenomenology has subsequently developed and differentiated into a 
complex array of different traditions (Allen-Collinson, 2009), including existential and 
hermeneutic strands. The term itself derives from the Greek phainomenon, with the root 
phôs, or light; phainomenon is therefore that which is placed in the light, made apparent or 
shown to us. From this is derived the English phenomenon: an appearance, an observable 
occurrence. Phenomenology thus constitutes the study of phenomena, things as they 
present themselves to, and are perceived in, consciousness (Allen-Collinson, 2016). 
Noumena, in contrast, are considered the objects ‘producing’ the phenomena, although the 
notion of an object’s independent existence remains contested within different philosophical 
traditions. Intentionality was a key element in Husserl’s (1970) oeuvre, developed from 
Brentano’s (1874/1995) earlier thinking, and highlighting that human consciousness is always 
directed toward something. The relationship between human consciousness and the world 
lies at the heart of phenomenology, and studying phenomena requires the phenomenologist 
temporarily to engage in the epochē (a form of bracketing). This process requires us to ‘take 
a step back’ from the world of everyday, and from our own taken-for-granted understandings 
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– termed the ‘natural attitude’ - in order to contemplate what it is to be a participant in the 
world, and how things present themselves to us (Sokolowski, 2000). In brief, the aim is to 
approach the phenomenon under study with an open and questioning attitude, suspending 
as far as possible our taken-for-granted, everyday assumptions and presuppositions. 
Whilst Husserl’s focus was primarily on the mind-world nexus, existential 
phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002) have highlighted the centrality of 
our corporeality in lived experience; the body as the point from which we perceive and ‘live’ 
the world from a first-person perspective (the perspective of ‘le corps propre’/one’s own 
body). This ‘lived body’ links mind-body-world in an indissoluble relationship, so that mind-
body-world constitute part of the very fabric or ‘flesh’ of the world, as Merleau-Ponty (1968) 
argues in his later, and unfinished work, which moves away from the traditional 
phenomenological focus upon the primacy of consciousness. Of further note, and drawing 
from his earlier work, Merleau-Ponty (2002: xx) takes the Husserlian notion of intentionality 
and identifies a specific variant: operant or operative intentionality, which refers to the pre-
reflective and corporeal link that a subject has with the world.  
Moving to consider our specific form of sociological phenomenology, Husserl’s 
phenomenology was first applied within (North American) sociology by Alfred Schütz (1967) 
whose sociological attention was piqued particularly by the Husserlian conception of the 
lifeworld (Lebenswelt).  Schütz adapted and developed aspects of Husserl’s thinking to create 
a phenomenological-sociology or sociological-phenomenology (Wagner, 1973).  Here, we 
thus draw upon what has been conceptualised as phenomenologically-inspired sociology or 
‘sociologized’ phenomenology (Allen-Collinson, 2009, 2011), a phenomenological form that 
diverges from philosophical phenomenology, to acknowledge the myriad effects of culture 
and social structure upon lived-body experience. Whereas philosophical phenomenology 
seeks to identify ‘essences’ of phenomena, fundamental and universal patterns or structures 
of experience spanning all time and all people, sociological phenomenology acknowledges 
the possibility of ‘difference’ in some aspects of lived experience. Feminist 
phenomenologists, for example, highlight the role of sex or gender difference in lived 
embodied experience (e.g. Fisher and Embree, 2000).  
The empirical, sociological form of phenomenology (Allen-Collinson, 2016) we utilize 
thus draws upon Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) existential phenomenology in highlighting the 
centrality of the body in human experience, together with the conceptualization of world, 
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body and human consciousness as fundamentally intertwined and mutually influencing 
(Allen-Collinson, 2009). Given the centrality of the body in doing sport, it is perhaps surprising 
that this form of existential phenomenology has not been employed more widely in the study 
of sport (Allen-Collinson, 2009; Kerry and Armour, 2000). A growing corpus is, however, 
beginning to develop, for example, in relation to Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) (Vaittinen, 2014), 
distance running (Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2016), dance (Purser, 2019), and rowing (Ravn 
and Christensen, 2014), to which we contribute our data on the lifeworld of competitive 
swimming.  
Germane to our analysis are other theoretical perspectives that similarly draw upon 
corporeally-contoured insights, such as Mauss’ (1979) ‘techniques of the body’ that portray 
the mental, physical and social aspects of human being as an irreducible whole. Skills and 
techniques thus become habit, but not as mere mechanical repetitions of action, but rather 
as the ability to grasp and incorporate within one’s body schema a tacit and practical 
‘principle’ of action that permits new ways of acting and understanding, creating the ‘habit-
body’ (Crossley, 2001: 127). Leder’s (1990) phenomenologically-inspired conceptualization of 
the ‘dis-appearing‘ and ‘dys-appearing’ body is also pertinent here, as is that of Zeiler’s (2010) 
‘eu-appearing body1’. For Leder (1990), the body is generally in a state of ‘dis-appearance’ 
during the general flow of normal day-to-day activity, remaining largely absent from our 
consciousness. Our focus is not inward to our body but outward to the world, and our body 
remains in the ‘background’. In contrast, the ‘dys-appearing’ body is characterized by a state 
of ‘dys-ease’ when the body shifts position from backgrounded presence to constitute the 
direct focus of consciousness, for example, when pain or illness disrupts the body-world 
relationship and commands attention. Moreover, the more positive and even pleasurable 
aspects of such body intentionality have been highlighted by Zeiler (2010: 334), who notes, 
‘the subject can attend to her or his body as something positive and that this attention need 
not result in discomfort or alienation’.  
Having given a brief overview of our phenomenologically inspired approach, we now 
delineate the research project in which we investigated the phenomenological nexus of mind-
body-environment in sporting experience. This domain remains sociologically under-
 
1 Eu-appearance – Zeiler (2010) uses the Greek prefix eu to highlight the experience of the body as well, easy or 
good. 
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researched, particularly, as highlighted above, vis-à-vis Shilling’s (2017) call for sociology to 
investigate body pedagogics as an embodied approach to the acquisition of sporting practices 
-  in our case within the culture of competitive swimming. 
 
The research 
Ethical approval was granted by the relevant university ethics committee prior to data 
collection. Ethnographic data were gathered by the first author during a full swimming season 
(September to July) from two performance groups of competitive swimmers comprising 36 
swimmers, aged 18-22, based at one of the top ranked sporting universities in the UK. The 
University has a long history of producing senior performance swimmers with numerous 
international representations and honours. As we have noted elsewhere (McNarry et al., 
2019), phenomenology is not a method in the traditional sense of a research technique, but 
is an approach that embraces a whole way of thinking and reflecting, characterized by an 
attitude of openness, curiosity and ceaseless questioning of the taken-for-granted (Allen-
Collinson, 2009; 2016). Indeed, Merleau-Ponty (2002: xv) highlights that to see the world 
phenomenologically we must: ‘break with our familiar acceptance of it’, temporarily 
bracketing our existing pre-suppositions and assumptions via the process of epochē (see also 
Allen-Collinson, 2011). One of the key initial challenges, therefore, was for the primary 
researcher to undertake bracketing conversations with the supervisory team, who sought to  
‘unveil’ and problematize his tacit knowledge and assumptions about the lifeworld of 
competitive swimming; a world with which he was very familiar through his own lived 
experience.  
The primary researcher adopted the role of a volunteer assistant; a familiar role given 
that he had been both a swimmer and swimming coach, making him what some have termed 
a ‘cultured insider’ (Evers, 2006; Wheaton, 2002). This allowed him to select information-rich 
cases in the form of participants with direct lived experience of the performance-swimming 
lifeworld, and permitted him privileged access to the field site where, in total, over 300 hours 
of observations were completed across three, five-week immersions: 2 October to 4 
November, 2017; 24 January to 28 February, 2018; 20 June to 21 July 2018. Observations 
were recorded via the OneNote application on the first author’s iPhone, with subsequent 
detailed notes written up immediately following each session. These notes recorded what 
was going on in the session, what the swimmers did, how they did it, and how it seemed to 
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affect them. Notes were taken not only about specific incidents or moments, but also 
regarding the normal, everyday routines of the swimming sessions. Most of the notes were 
written in the form of a first-person narrative, allowing for the inclusion of the primary 
researcher’s own reflections from the field, and providing him with a space to reflect upon 
the more nuanced individual behaviours he observed. Data were also collected via semi-
structured interviews (19 individual and three group interviews), with sampling criteria for 
interviewees constituting: 1) being an active member of one of the performance swimming 
squads; and 2) having competed at a minimum of British Championship level in the previous 
12 months. These criteria ensured that participants had a high level of commitment to, and 
familiarity with the sport, and thus were in a position to provide rich, in-depth descriptions of 
their aquatic lifeworld.  
The interviews drew inspiration from Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009) ‘lifeworld’ interview 
process, which is commensurate with a phenomenologically-sensitive approach, and: 
‘attempts to understand themes of the lived everyday world from the subject’s own 
perspectives’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: 27). Although some sports psychologists (Dale, 
1996; Nesti, 2004) have argued that a more unstructured phenomenological interview is 
better suited to a phenomenological study, in this case such an approach would have been 
problematic for a number of reasons, including the age of the participants, the challenging 
demands of a phenomenological interview, and the time necessary for an effective encounter 
to take place. In total, 19 athletes (12 men and 7 women) were interviewed, spanning a range 
of experience: of different swimming strokes, events, and level of competition - from British 
Championship level through to those who had competed internationally including at the 
World Championships and the Commonwealth Games.  
Initial individual interviews were recorded on a Dictaphone during ‘immersion one’ and 
transcribed verbatim. A follow up interview was held with each participant during ‘immersion 
two’ to gain further information and (if needed) clarification on comments made in the initial 
interview. Three final group interviews were conducted during ‘immersion three’ as a means 
of engaging with the process of member reflection in order to permit sharing and dialoguing 
with participants about the study’s findings, and providing opportunities for questions, 
critique, feedback, and affirmation (Tracy, 2010). This was not considered a ‘member-
checking’ procedure, but rather as a further data collection opportunity in which we sought 
to: ‘yield new data which throws fresh light on the investigation and which provides a spur 
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for deeper and richer analyses’ (Bloor, 2001: 235). Data analysis was undertaken via the 
reflexive thematic analysis (TA) approach outlined by Braun and Clarke (2013; 2019). This 
involved the primary researcher familiarizing himself with the data by listening to and reading 
the various transcripts on several occasions, then generating initial codes, searching and 
defining themes, and discussing these in detail with research supervisors. TA is thus more an 
‘adventure than a recipe’ (Braun and Clarke, 2019: 4) where one moves back and forth as 
required between the data and the analysis, refining and redeveloping the generated themes 
and concepts in order to construct knowledge from the data. In the data extracts that follow 
all participants have been given pseudonyms, and their ages are included. We have, however, 
not provided greater detail of participant characteristics, in order to protect their anonymity, 
given the relatively small overall population of British university performance swimmers and 
the likelihood of identifiability.  Several key themes were identified in the data cohering 
around the ways in which competitive swimmers engage with ‘doing’ swimming: 1) the 
process of mindful swimming, to maintain efficiency and speed; 2) mindful changing and 
development of technique; 3) the pre-reflective, ‘switched off’ swimming of recovery 
sessions. 
  
The mindful ‘doing’ of competitive swimming 
A key feature to the process of ‘doing’ competitive swimming is understanding that ‘doing’ 
involves, as Throsby (2016: 28) notes, a ‘self-orientated project of perpetual improvement-
focused embodied labor that is accomplished reflexively and iteratively’. Each time swimmers 
enter the water (or the gym), their aim is to improve as an athlete. The competitive swimming 
body thus is an ongoing embodied project that is continuously worked on, in a social and 
cultural context where the body is deemed both malleable through hard work and vigilance, 
as well as being a social symbol that ‘gives off’ messages about the self (Shilling, 2012: 7). The 
competitive swimming-body, like Throsby’s (2016) marathon swimming body, is therefore a 
body that is ‘made’ via hard work and commitment. The swimmers in this study, however, 
indicated holding views of the competitive swimming body as being both ‘born’ and ‘made’; 
a combination of genetic luck and the undertaking of considerable embodied labor: 
 …of the people who have been given certain physical benefits, out of that 
group of people it’s the ones that work hard out of them that will make it, do 
you know what I mean. So, I think you need both (Stephen, 20). 
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A key element of this embodied labor is the acclimatization to a variety of swimming-
specific body techniques that characterize the competitive swimming body and give shape to 
the competitive swimming habitus. Here we employ a phenomenological conceptualization 
of the habitus, which is seen as a ‘lived-through structure-in-process, constantly evolving as 
an effect of the interactions of the agent or group with both others and their physical 
environment’ (Crossley, 2004: 39). This interactive process involves the development and 
refinement of habituated bodily actions that become part of the individual’s corporeal 
schema. There is thus a specific mode of being, doing, and understanding that swimmers have 
to incorporate and embody in order to engage effectively and cope with the physical and 
psychological demands of the sport, as well as to belong to the wider community of 
competitive swimmers. These ‘techniques of the body’ (Mauss, 1979) or ‘habits’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002) are acquired through a process of apprenticeship in culturally-specific contexts 
(Shilling, 2010) as a form of body pedagogics (Allen-Collinson et al., 2018; Shilling, 2017), and 
are essential to the production of the competitive swimming body and lifeworld. Such 
acquisition requires the ability not only to swim, but to swim effectively, efficiently, and 
ultimately quickly. While there may be a minimum standard below which competitive 
swimming becomes untenable (e.g. failing to reach squad selection times), there is no end 
point of success. The swimmers must undertake meter after meter of ‘mindful swimming’ in 
order to embody swimming habits that enhance fitness, efficiency and speed. This process of 
‘mindful swimming’ resonates with the phenomenological focus on the mind-body linkage 
and also draws on the use of the kinaesthetic and proprioceptive senses to highlight how 
movement is experienced. This was encapsulated by Stephen (20) in describing how these 
athletes, who already have a high level of technical skill, must still mindfully be engaged in 
‘doing’ swimming: 
…for me personally, I'm very aware of what’s going on in my body when I 
swim…very aware of where my body is. It’s like, you can swim with your hips 
really low so I’ll, when we did that set the other week I’m fully tense so that I’m 
keeping my hips high in alignment so they're not causing extra drag, like, that’s 
my thought the whole time, just staying in a good strong position. 
 
Stephen refers here to actively having to engage his core muscles to keep his hips high in the 
water during a challenging swimming set, to ensure he remains technically efficient and as 
fast as possible. In a follow-up session, Stephen elaborated on the active nature of ‘doing’: 
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On a good day I will be engaged in every single stroke. I’ll be thinking about 
where my hand goes in, what my catch is like, what position my elbow is in, 
where my hips are. I am always switched on and thinking about what I’m doing 
in this situation. There is always something to focus on in more detail. (Stephen, 
20) 
 
Similarly, several swimmers identified the need to stay mindfully involved in what they 
were doing, in order to keep stroke technique, efficiency and therefore speed at optimal 
levels. This active engagement resonates with a form of dys-appearance (Leder, 1990) or eu-
appearance (Zeiler, 2010), as the active process of engaging with technique brings certain 
parts of the body directly into consciousness via intentionality. Elements of this could be 
discomforting, as Scott recalled, noting how adjusting his freestyle technique resulted in: 
‘using muscles that [he] hadn’t been using before, and so [he] got really bad aches and stuff 
in [his] shoulders’. Scott’s shoulders came to occupy the ‘to’ in Leder’s (1990) ‘from-to’ 
structure, where attention was firmly directed towards feelings in his shoulders as opposed 
to outward toward the world, until his new technique became incorporated into his body-
schema and his shoulders receded into the background once again. Such sensory engagement 
results in positive sensory experiences of eu-appearance (Zeiler, 2010) where the body feels 
good, efficient and fast:  
You just feel like, streamlined and there is almost like no drag on you, you just 
like, you can just pull and just, feels like you can just keep on going, like, I think 
the only way you can say it is just feeling smooth like. It just feels effortless, like 
swimming along is just like nothing holding you back (Charles, 20). 
  
When everything is good you feel like you are on top of the water, if you know 
what I mean. When, when your technique is there you feel like you feel 
powerful, like you…feel like you’re not pulling yourself through the water you’re 
just like, over the water if you know what I mean (Wade, 20). 
 
The social aspects of somatic learning should also be noted, for it was regularly observed 
how the swimmers would help each other, for example, in offering stroke technique advice, 
such as when Frank, a butterfly swimmer, was working with Eddie, an individual medley (IM) 
swimmer, on his butterfly technique. Similarly, the backstroke community (men and women) 
would get together to work on starts or turns (Fieldnotes, February 2018). In these situations, 
the swimmers would draw on other swimmers’ differing styles and experiences to help 
engage in a process of technical improvement, as the following fieldnote reveals:  
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The backstroke community then gathers to work on their starts. There is 
Stephen, Wade, Remy, Scott and Pepper all helping to analyse and coach each 
other. Nick is doing some filming as well to give each of the guys some visual 
feedback. This shared learning and coaching is great to see as they all genuinely 
enjoy helping each other and want to see each other improve (Fieldnote, 13th 
February 2018 AM). 
 
Through such interactions and the sharing of information between swimmers, as well as 
between coaches and swimmers, skills and techniques are developed and refined. The 
learning and development of these techniques is therefore intersubjective and 
intercorporeal, shaped by the various discourses, practices, and social relations that form the 
performance swimming lifeworld. 
It should be emphasized, however, that despite attaining a high level of technical 
proficiency at certain times, such skills and level of performance are only temporary; there is 
no fixed end point at which corporeal skills are developed and sedimented once-and-for-all 
(Allen-Collinson et al., 2018). The fluid and evolving nature of ‘doing’ renders it difficult to 
ascertain a point at which technical efficiency is achieved. The goal for these highly skilled 
athletes thus becomes less about learning new skills or techniques and more about constantly 
refining their current skillset through repetitive, mindful action over the entire course of a 
swimmer’s career as the following section highlights.  
 
The 'mindful’ changing or development of technique 
Changing or developing technique is a difficult process, in which the swimmers must challenge 
their own proprioceptive memory and habits. Usually, the swimmers undertake one or two 
specific technique and skill development sessions per week, with technical work also built into 
warm-ups, preparatory work and/or swim-downs. Technical work is also incorporated into 
most sessions at the beginning of the season (first 3-4 weeks); a time regarded by the coaches 
as optimal for this kind of work, with the swimmers being freshly returned from a break. 
Changing technique involves a highly conscious and active process through which bodily 
memories are changed over time through the working and reworking of bodies (Spencer, 
2009). The swimmers and coaches work together on this technical development, casting their 
gaze over others, scrutinizing their technique, and offering suggestions on how to increase 
the level of technical swimming performance. For example, a hand that over-reaches on a 
13 | P a g e  
 
backstroke entry (to the water) may well feel like it is in the right place to the swimmer, 
whereas in reality it is actually behind the head rather than in line with the shoulder. To 
change this, the swimmers may utilize video recordings to identify the technical fault and give 
them the opportunity subsequently to deploy their embodied knowledge in a different way. 
As Crossley (2007: 89) argues: ‘agents can learn to find parts of their body and mobilize them 
in new ways’. Technique correction therefore requires a state of watchfulness and 
mindfulness, where a swimmer’s intentionality and action are directed to specific body parts 
and feelings. In correcting such over-reaching in backstroke, for instance, swimmers were 
often left with the sensation that their arm was entering the water at ninety degrees to their 
shoulder when actually they had moved it only a few centimeters from behind their head to 
in-line with the shoulder. This example highlights how the process of change often results in 
an alien or disjointed feeling, and bodily dys-appearance (Leder, 1990) also emphasized by 
Wade (20): 
When you first do it, it makes you're stroke just feel weird, but then obviously if 
you keep doing it and keep doing it, you get used to it. But, the first initial 
change, it, it throws you a bit, like your like, 'ok my stroke feels a bit weird now' 
but then you get back used to it again. 
 
This process of developing somatic ways of knowing (Allen-Collinson et al., 2016), 
involving change, refinement and evolution, is far from linear, and often results in repetitive 
steps backwards and forwards, as Peter (21) emphasized: 
Doing technique is probably the most awkward thing that you can do in 
swimming, because when you swim for so long, you get into a routine of what 
‘normal’ is. So, you get into the rhythm… and then all of a sudden someone tells 
you you’re doing it wrong, or, ‘change this’ … So, it completely shakes off your 
feel. It’s very much a psychological game as well, because changing a thing 
technically is easy, but believing that what you’re changing is actually beneficial 
is the big barrier that you need to overcome. Also, to have the psychological 
willpower to carry on, because technique doesn’t change overnight, and 
adapting to a technical change typically takes you back one step. The hope is 
that you go two steps forward, but a lot of the problem is that when you go back 
that one step, people stop, and they go back to old ways because it doesn’t feel 
right or…you feel disjointed… So, yeah, your body just feels awkward, and it’s 
because of that awkwardness that you often revert back to your old technique. 
 
Peter’s quote again highlights the linkage between mind and body in the ‘doing’ of swimming. 
He emphasizes how, when making technical adjustments, the swimmers must be ‘in-tune’ 
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with the movements of their body and must continue to focus on the new technique for an 
extended period of time in order for adjustments to their habit-body to be made. Somatic 
attunement (Allen-Collinson and Owton, 2015) and listening to their bodies thus become 
important embodied processes for these athletes as they negotiate changes in technique, but 
also different types of training, and periods of the season. This attunement results in a greater 
understanding of their embodied capabilities. Such understanding can, however, be ‘lost’ 
during times out of the water at the end of a season, or as a result of injury, where levels of 
physical conditioning can diminish and a ‘feel for the water’ is lost. These instances can 
engender in the swimmers a sense of having forgotten how to ‘do’ swimming, and of having 
lost their embodied swimming hexis, as Peter (21) indicated: 
Swimming’s one of those things that you lose, unfortunately. So, I have two days 
out of the water, and I lose all feel and catch. It’s one of those sports that’s, it’s 
gone as quick as [pause]. So, if you’re out a day, you will feel the consequences 
of being out a day, which is why we have such a vigorous schedule. 
 
Furthermore, Peter’s and the other swimmers’ accounts drew attention to the habitual 
nature of ‘doing’ swimming. Although the swimmers often referred to technique as a habit, 
the fluid and evolving nature of ‘doing’ adds illustrative weight to Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) 
concept of habit, not as a fixed, mechanical, response to stimuli, but as an ‘agentic’, flexible 
power of responding to situations. Habit therefore is a form of embodied and practical 
understanding, or know-how, that is grasped and incorporated into one’s bodily schema, 
often as a tacit and practical principle of action (Crossley, 2001); a form of bodily knowledge 
resulting from physical sensations and increased bodily awareness (Lawrence, 2012). This 
flexibility of habit is highlighted by how in practice the swimmers engage with a variety of 
drills or periods of trial and error that are designed to give them the opportunity to direct 
their intentionality to a specific element of their technique or body part that needs scrutiny, 
so that over time this leads to the effective performance of refined skilled movement. As this 
new movement pattern becomes habituated, the swimmers no longer have to focus their 
intentionality on the new component of their technique; it has been incorporated into their 
body schema and as a result often recedes into background awareness, allowing them to shift 
their attention to other technical or tactical elements. This point was emphasized by Clint (20) 
who in reference to changing his technique indicated how this may initially make him slower 
as he had to think about the change but: 
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…when it actually then starts to become inbuilt again, you don’t actually have to 
think about it and you start going quicker because you can focus on the rest of 
the stuff that you’re doing, [for example] the pace that you’re [swimming] at. 
 
This complex, fluid dynamic of ‘doing’ helps illuminate how skillful action is developed as a 
whole. 
Furthermore, the spatial dimension is important in ‘doing’ swimming and changing 
technique, for as Moya (2014: 1) notes, with reference to Merleau-Ponty (2002), the lived 
human body relates to space that is also ‘lived’. Habit thus presupposes a form of 
understanding that the body has in terms of operating within a certain world, establishing an 
operant or operative intentionality (Merleau-Ponty, 2002) which refers to the pre-reflective 
and corporeal link that a subject has with the world. The corporeal subject (swimmer) inhabits 
a world (aquatic) that provokes certain questions that need resolving. The body therefore 
must adapt in order to solve these questions. In the case of these swimmers that question 
most often relates to how to move through water faster. As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: 138) 
note: ‘the environment therefore calls forth a specific body-style so that the body works with 
the environment and is included in it. The posture the body adopts in a situation is its way of 
responding to the environment’. Similarly, Ingold (2000: 230) notes how our knowledge of 
the environment undergoes continuous formation in the very course of our moving in it. The 
body therefore must anticipate and react to a constantly changing environment, which is 
perhaps made even more pertinent by the fluidity and viscosity of water. Matthew (22) 
eloquently sums up this constant fluid, evolving, dynamic interaction between the swimming 
body-mind and environment: 
I like the fact that we are in water and that there is nothing stable about water. 
It’s always moving, and it’s the same with how you feel and how you approach 
every day. You have to just constantly keep changing the way you approach 
things. 
 
Habit therefore bears a direct relation to the dialogue between subject and 
environment. Competitive swimming thus involves embracing an embodied feel in addition 
to objective knowledge; one cannot become a competitive swimmer simply by reading about 
it, one must actively engage with the aquatic world in order to ‘do’ swimming. As Ingold 
(2000) points out, the skill of doing is grounded in the ‘attentive perceptual involvement’ with 
one’s environment: 
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…foundations of skill lie in the irreducible condition of the practitioner’s 
embeddedness in an environment…[where] through repeated practical trials, 
and guided by observations [of accomplished practitioners], he [sic] gradually 
gets the ‘feel’ of things for himself - that is, he learns to fine-tune his own 
movements so as to achieve the rhythmic fluency of the accomplished 
practitioner (Ingold, 2000: 353). 
 
Thus, swimming-body pedagogics highlight the indissoluble body-mind-world nexus lying at 
the heart of sociological phenomenology. 
 
Pre-reflexive, ‘switched off’ swimming 
Finally, it is important to note that the swimmers did also allude to times when they ‘switched 
off’, usually during recovery sessions, disengaging the mind from ‘doing’ and paying little 
attention to their body, in order to escape the pressures of competitive swimming and simply 
be present in the aquatic moment, as both Mary-Jane (22) and Jessica (20) reflected: 
Mary-Jane: I think, well there is [sic] two things. Firstly, swimming training does 
put a lot of pressure on the body and mind, so it’s difficult to stay 100% engaged 
for 12 sessions including gym a week. That’s one reason why I don’t think you 
can, but also because in a race pace session you train to get better. In a speed 
session there’s that focus of front-end speed2. In a recovery session, well 
sometimes the point of a recovery session is just to not think. So, entering that, 
if you know it’s a recovery session, you’re not going to be as focused…  
 
Like a recovery session, it’s ok to switch off. It’s ok to not concentrate, or to not 
care, or to have loads of rest, or talk, you know what I mean? 
 
Jessica: I kind of think they are written [by the coaches] to not really think about 
as well. So, say if you are going for a run, you go for a hard sprint…or you choose 
to go for a nice stroll around a park…you’re not really thinking when you are 
strolling but when you are running at a pace you're really focused on getting 
better and fitter. Whereas when you're walking you almost feel a pleasure. 
 
This idea of ‘letting go’ and ‘just swimming’ resonates with Leder’s (1990) notion of the 
‘dis-appearing’ mode of being-in-the-world. The swimmer’s attention is drawn away from 
their own body and out towards the world. As a result, bodily awareness recedes into the 
background, evading explicit exploration. Such corporeal ‘absence’ in which the swimmers’ 
 
2 Front-end Speed refers to the pace that the swimmers would target during the first part of their races. For 
example, it might be the pace they would like to swim for the 1st 50m or 1st 100m of a 200m event. 
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focus is from the body to the objects of experience, allows the swimmers to enjoy ‘just being’ 
in their aquatic lifeworld. Such a position is still, however, only possible when mind and body 
act harmoniously with the environment or situation in which people are engaged. Such a 
position further highlights the mind-body-world nexus, as well as the importance of the 
‘incorporation’ of skills and habits into one’s body schema, as a form of body pedagogics, so 
that the sensory bodily actions of swimming become part of the swimmers own highly 
technical pre-reflexive bodily know-how. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate how the embodied doing of swimming and 
a swimmer’s ability to inhabit the competitive swimming lifeworld are dependent on the 
acquisition of a specific set of swimming techniques and skilled behaviors, acquired through 
a complex, cyclical process. This demands experimentation, discovery and the ability 
constantly to adjust and adapt, depending on the practice (Downey, 2005), as well as linking 
mind, body and world. Skill acquisition and ‘doing’ therefore is not just about ‘prestigious 
imitation’ as Mauss (1979) described, but also about the social nature of such somatic 
learning, as requiring input from others (Shilling, 2007; Throsby, 2016). In this particular case, 
coaches and other swimmers were involved, as illustrated above by, for example, the group 
of specialist backstroke swimmers, whose members worked together in order to enhance 
each other’s learning and technical development. In this way the body is socialized into 
physical-culturally specific ways of being, in that individuals incorporate patterns of action 
into their ‘flesh’, and that flesh is conditioned by the activity in an interlinked process.  
The findings described in this article derive from a study that inevitably has some 
limitations, being a relatively small-scale project on senior competitive swimmers (aged 18-
22) with a primarily white-British background (with the exception of four athletes two of 
whom were not interviewed, and two white-Irish athletes) from one performance swimming 
programme. Whilst the aim of the sociological-phenomenological project was never 
generalization to wider populations, the findings do address qualitative-appropriate 
conceptualizations of ‘naturalistic’ and ‘analytic’ generalizability and transferability (Smith, 
2018) to other physical-cultural domains. The data thus resonate with other research studies 
that focus upon the acquisition and habituation of a specific set of body techniques that afford 
sportspeople the opportunity to participate in, as well as shape their various sporting bodies 
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into corporeally proficient bodies, for example, in the Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu grappler’s body 
(Hogeveen, 2013), the circuit training body (Crossley, 2004), or the marathon swimming body 
(Throsby, 2016). 
One of the most salient findings from the project was the extent to which the ‘doing’ 
and ‘learning how’ of swimming are so strongly socially, and physical-culturally shaped. This 
offers insight into the dynamic and dialectical nature of embodied action as well as the 
centrality and malleability of our embodied being-in-the-world. Our embodiment thus offers 
us a unique reference point from which to experience the world, as well as simultaneously 
being shaped on an ongoing basis by time, space and our relation to others. Merleau-Ponty’s 
(2002) phenomenology is a powerful resource in analyzing this dynamic, and acknowledging 
not only the centrality of the body to our experiencing of the world, but also the capacity for 
humans to expand their body schemas through the learning of new skills, or the development 
and refinement of extant skills. From this standpoint one’s own body, or le corps propre, 
anchors the swimmers in, and allows them to engage with the world around them. In 
emphasizing the centrality of the body in lived experience, Merleau-Ponty (1968), in his later 
work, recast the very notion of being-in-the-world as flesh-of-the-world, or ‘chair’, better to 
convey what Author 2 and another (2014: 549) term our ‘corpo-reality’. It is this ‘corpo-
reality’ that allows the swimmers to engage with the different practices of their aquatic 
environment in order to bring about, through intelligent practice (Marchand, 2010), both 
reflective and pre-reflective skilled ‘doing’. As a result, the swimmers develop a tacit, 
embodied knowledge or know-how that forms their aquatic corporeal schema. The swimming 
body is thus a lived body that is conscious, active, reflexive, and fundamentally linked to the 
world as part of a single mind-body-world system. It should be cautioned, however, that skill 
and habit are not permanent, or learnt once and for all, and as well as offering the capacity 
to being developed and refined, they can also degenerate, as Peter noted when describing 
how the swimming ‘feel’ can be lost after only two days out of the aquatic environment. This 
highlights how the competitive swimming lifeworld is a dynamic, fluid, lived-through 
structure in-process, that constantly ‘(de-)evolves’ as an effect of the interactions, or lack of 
interactions that an agent has with others, and with their physical aquatic environment.  
Responding to calls to explore further the domain of ‘body pedagogics’ (Shilling, 2017), 
and drawing on original findings, this article offers a novel theoretical approach to the 
sociologically under-researched physical-cultural domain of competitive swimming, with a 
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particular focus on the everyday training routines involved. Here, we have investigated how 
swimmers develop some of the practical, embodied ways of knowing how to ‘do’ swimming, 
developed and refined by competitive swimmers, as ‘sensate, suffering, skilled, sedimented, 
and situated creature[s] of flesh and blood’ (Wacquant 2015: 1). The study contributes to a 
small, but growing corpus that employs a sociological-phenomenological approach to subject 
to detailed scrutiny the everyday and often taken-for-granted aspects of sporting 
embodiment. It further develops a corporeally and sensorially grounded ‘carnal sociology’ 
(Crossley, 1995) that draws on the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1968, 2002). 
Beyond the academic contribution, the research findings can provide competitive-swimming 
coaches with insights  garnered from an in-depth study of the lifeworlds of the athletes whom 
they seek to train and develop, for example, on the importance of the mind-body nexus in 
somatic learning, the role of mindfulness, and also the need to accord athletes the time and 
space to engage in ‘switched-off’ swimming. 
 
Notes 
1. Eu-appearance. Zeiler (2010) uses the Greek prefix eu to highlight the experience of the body as well, easy or good. 
2. Front-end speed refers to the pace that the swimmers would target during the first part of their races. For example, it might 
be the pace they would like to swim for the first 50m of a 100m event, or the first 100m of a 200m event. 
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